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Choice, Competition, and Segregation in a
United Kingdom Urban Education Market
CHRIS TAYLOR
Cardiff University
There has been a great deal of research into school choice and the education
quasi-market that has dominated compulsory school provision in the United
Kingdom since the early 1980s. Much of this research fails to address the context
in which processes of choice exist alongside the patterns and outcomes of choice
and competition, leading to considerable dispute within UK debates on the
impact of school choice. The apparent contradiction can be bridged by focusing
on the geographic particularities of the education market at various scales. This
article examines one urban education market in the United Kingdom. In map-
ping the context and patterns of school choice and competition, the article begins
to offer new insights into understanding recent trends in social segregation be-
tween schools. Such an approach to studying the impact of open enrollment
and the marketization of compulsory schooling represents a necessary shift to-
ward the development of a geography of school choice.
Introduction
In the United Kingdom much of the debate about school choice and education
quasi-markets in state school provision has been dominated by issues of equity
and segregation. With the expansion of school choice and school diversity
during the 1980s there was considerable concern that this would exacerbate
social inequalities and lead to a two-tier system of provision in the state
education system (Adler et al. 1989; Brown 1990; Burdett 1988). Many op-
ponents of school choice generally argued that school choice would privilege
some groups of families over others. The central concern has been that middle-
class families, with greater social and cultural capital than more working-class
families, will be able to utilize school choice to their class advantage. This
advantage is conceived in three main ways; in terms of the quality of provision,
access to school places, and the social class composition of school intakes. The
Electronically published May 26, 2009
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argument continues that schools will become increasingly segregated between
different social groups. Consequently, after the massification of open enroll-
ment and the emergence of a new education market in 1988 there were a
number of important and detailed studies primarily interested in the processes
and inequities of school choice (David 1993; Gewirtz et al. 1995; Reay and
Ball 1997; Tomlinson 1997; Willms and Echols 1992; Woods et al. 1998). It
was not uncommon for these studies to provide evidence that choice, social
class, and space were interconnected and related to different “circuits of school-
ing,” particularly between working-class “locals” and middle-class “cosmo-
politans” (Ball et al. 1995). Consequently, the choice system appeared to priv-
ilege families who had greater social, cultural, and economic capital over
“disconnected” (Gewirtz et al. 1994) or “inert” (Willms and Echols 1992)
families who tended to be from more socioeconomically disadvantaged back-
grounds. Such research provided convincing evidence that “the market works
as a class strategy by creating a mechanism which can be exploited by the
middle classes as a strategy of reproduction in their search of relative advan-
tage, social advancement and mobility” (Ball 1993, 17). And this generally
led to the conclusion that “the exercise of choice as a process of maintaining
social distinctions and educational differentiations, as related to social class
and the class composition of schools, is likely to exaggerate social segregation”
(Ball et al. 1996, 110–11).
However, the first large-scale study to examine the changing socioeconomic
composition of school intakes in two countries of the United Kingdom, En-
gland and Wales, found rather contrasting outcomes (Gorard et al. 2003).
This research measured the segregation of children eligible for free school
meals, as a proxy for socioeconomic status, between all state-maintained sec-
ondary schools in England and Wales between 1989 and 2002. It suggested
that there has not been the dramatic increase in segregation between schools
as forecasted. Indeed, in many areas, levels of between-school segregation had
fallen. It was not surprising, therefore, that the controversial and apparently
contrary findings from this landmark study sparked considerable debate (Allen
and Vignoles 2007; Croxford and Paterson 2006; Gibson and Asthana 2002;
Goldstein and Noden 2003; Gorard 2004, 2007; Noden 2002). Although some
important differences have been identified in these subsequent analyses, the
general conclusion made in the original study by Gorard et al. (2003) has
largely been endorsed: “Using alternative measures, we agree with Gorard et
al.’s main conclusion that there has been no substantial across the board
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increase in socio-economic segregation between schools in the majority of
LEAs since the Education Reform Act of 1988” (Allen and Vignoles 2007,
664). With the recent availability of national pupil-level data in England and
Wales the often intense debate has more recently shifted toward discussing
and improving the measurement of between-school segregation: “This is a
field of study in which the empirical differences are small and methodological
issues, though sometimes difficult, are important,” Goldstein and Noden con-
clude (2003, 273). In particular, there may be important developments in the
measurement of school segregation using modeling techniques (such as multi-
level modeling) rather than using more traditional descriptive analytical tools
(such as the Dissimilarity Index and the Segregation Index; Croxford and
Paterson 2006). While such statistical advances in measuring school segre-
gation are to be welcomed, they neglect the critical, and substantive, issue
that arises from the apparently contradictory findings of previous studies—
how can the existence of social class-biased school choices appear to result in
similar or even reduced social segregation between schools?
There are a number of reasons posited as to why levels of segregation
between schools in England and Wales appear relatively unchanged over the
last 20 years (Gorard et al. 2003). These include the incidence of residential
segregation, the “management” of supply and demand by the local authorities
who are ultimately responsible for ensuring every child is found a school place,
the inelasticity of school places, and changes in the overall levels of poverty.
But another important factor is that these studies are investigating very dif-
ferent phenomena. One set of largely qualitative studies has been primarily
concerned with the process of school choice, while the other set of largely
quantitative studies has been primarily concerned with the outcomes of school
choice. The main limitation of the latter is that these studies only “measure
changes in segregation in the descriptive sense. . . . These changes do not in
themselves . . . tell us anything about the process of segregating” (Croxford
and Paterson 2006, 401). The methodological distinction between these two
forms of research is illuminating, as quantitative data are often required to
rigorously and systematically measure changes in segregation. Conversely, the
process of choice is fairly complex and therefore requires more sophisticated
and detailed qualitative approaches. As a consequence, there are few analyses
on the outcome of school choice (i.e., the impact on school intakes and be-
tween-school segregation) that also consider the processes of choice and seg-
regation. The most notable of these include Allen (2007), Parsons et al. (2000),
and Taylor (2002). Although they are also largely quantitative studies, and
have therefore been able to measure the class composition of school intakes,
they have all attempted to consider how and why students are distributed
between particular schools. Importantly, what these studies have in common
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is their geographical approach, employing various forms of spatial analysis,
to studying the process and outcomes of school choice.
This article develops this geographical approach further by examining one
urban school market in detail. By making explicit and then focusing on the
physical location of schools and pupils in the urban market, the analysis
considers the direct relationship between measures of between-school segre-
gation and the movement of students between schools (i.e., the choice and
competition for school places). Uniquely, the article is able to demonstrate
how socioeconomic patterns of school choices can effect, or not effect, the
distribution of students between schools. In doing so it highlights the impor-
tance of examining the geographical particularities of the education market
at various scales—a feature that is often absent from many decontextualized
quantitative studies of school segregation. The article concludes by arguing
that such an approach to studying the impact of open enrollment and the
marketization of compulsory schooling represents a necessary shift toward the
development of a geography of school choice.
Toward a Geography of School Choice
Research that can be characterized as the sociology of school choice, that is,
social class analyses of choice, tend to dominate the literature on school choice
and education markets, and their findings have been well rehearsed. Although
space and place are often central to many sociological studies of school choice,
there have been few attempts to describe and consolidate the main geograph-
ical characteristics of school choice—reflecting the uneven spaces of choice
and competition in any given urban market. The focus in many studies tends
to be on how space constrains choice rather than the way space and choice
interrelate. Not only is it the case that parents generally choose from a limited
number of schools, but also the distance or time it takes to travel to school
remains an important factor in determining parents’ approaches to school
choice (Parsons et al. 2000; Taylor 2002). The local nature of school choice
may not be surprising. However, the significance of this is considerable in
determining parents’ success in obtaining a place in their preferred school
and, therefore, what impact these final outcomes have in terms of equity.
Furthermore, the importance of geography in the admissions policies and
procedures of schools and local authorities cannot be underestimated in de-
termining the process and outcomes of school choice (White et al. 2001). In
England and Wales there are limits to the number of students that a school
can admit—the Standard Admission Number. If there are more applications
than places, then various oversubscription criteria are applied. For the majority
of schools these criteria are mostly spatially defined, either as predefined catch-
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ment areas or as a proximity measure. Typically, where places are oversub-
scribed those students who live within the school’s catchment area or who
live nearest to the school are more likely to be allocated a place there. Not
only does this mean that popular schools may only be able to admit students
from within its immediate vicinity (Parsons et al. 2000), but it also tends to
reinforce the localized nature of education markets.
The geographical nature of admissions policies and procedures also serves
to reinforce the relationship between schooling and the housing markets (Butler
and Robson 2003; Taylor and Gorard 2001). In particular, there is increasing
evidence that residential areas around popular schools encourage a premium
in their property values (Gibbons and Machin 2006; Leech and Campos 2003).
Therefore, the levels of residential segregation in an area can have a direct
and significant relationship on levels of segregation between schools in that
area (Taylor and Gorard 2001).
Another important geographical feature of the education market in England
and Wales is the distribution of different kinds of state-funded schools. The
majority of schools in England and Wales are called Community schools. The
admissions process and allocation of school places is generally administered
by local authorities—the local government structure that constitutes England
and Wales. However, there are many other kinds of state-funded schools, such
as faith-based schools, Foundation schools, grammar schools, Academies, and
an increasing number of specialist schools, all of which control and administer
their own admissions arrangements. The existence and promotion of such
schools represents the UK government’s attempts to offer diversity within the
state-funded education market. Not only do these “divergent” schools have
their own geography (Taylor 2001a) but their general popularity tends to
ensure that these schools are oversubscribed and therefore in a position where
they have to select, covertly and overtly, which students will be offered a place
or not (West et al. 2004). Indeed, in areas where such divergent schools exist
it is common to find higher levels of and increasing socioeconomic segregation
between schools (Allen 2007; Gorard and Taylor 2001).
These spatial characteristics of the education market remind us that seg-
regation between schools is not simply a product of school choice. Urban
development, changes to school organization, the historical nature of education
provision, and social engineering of catchment areas—all prior to the 1980s
and recent school choice reforms—have all conspired to determine the current
levels of segregation between schools in England and Wales. Indeed, one of
the arguments for school choice is that open enrollment can help bypass some
of these long-standing constraints on some families’ educational opportunities.
It is important, therefore, that any study of school choice not only considers
the geography and wider context of the education market but also situates
the processes and outcomes of school choice within the everyday and “lived
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experience” of the education market (Waslander and Thrupp 1995; Woods
et al. 1998). Of course, most studies of the process of school choice are
predisposed to do this. However, most analyses of school segregation do not;
UK analyses of school segregation are often undertaken and presented at the
local authority, regional, or national level—not necessarily at the scale in which
choice actually occurs. To help facilitate this, the notion of competition spaces,
borrowed from studies of retail markets (Marsden et al. 1998), has been used
to capture the spatial distribution of schools and pupils and the movement of
pupils to schools (Taylor 2001b). Using this spatial framework to study school
choice has provided a useful way of distinguishing between different “local”
markets. The resulting patterns of school choice within these local markets
reflect three general types of competition between schools: (1) self-governing
competition spaces, (2) hierarchical competition spaces, and (3) nonhierarchical
competition spaces (Taylor 2001b, 208).
Self-governing competition spaces reflect choice and competition between
the minority divergent schools, particularly faith-based schools, as distinct from
the choice and competition of Community schools, which tend to occupy the
other distinct competition spaces. Given that admissions to divergent schools
in the United Kingdom have always been open to school choice, the recent
market reforms in education have largely been responsible for accentuating
the importance and significance of the latter two types of competition space:
hierarchical (i.e., where there are schools that tend to “gain” or “lose” pupils
from one another) and nonhierarchical (i.e., where there is either minor or
equivalent levels of choice between local schools).
Identifying the presence and significance of these different types of com-
petition space is not particularly difficult—interviews with parents and/or
school staff would probably reveal this. However, in order to also examine
the outcomes of these school choices, in terms of measuring segregation, it is
necessary to know about the choices and outcomes of every pupil attending
schools in any given competition space. Furthermore, since competition spaces
are not entirely discrete from one another, it is also necessary to know the
choices and outcomes of every pupil in all the neighboring competition spaces.
This does pose a particularly difficult set of methodological challenges. In-
terviewing every pupil would not usually be feasible, and a survey of pupils
would require a 100 percent response rate to ensure accuracy. One solution
to this, and the one that is employed in this article, is to use administrative
data for every pupil and analyze such data using a Geographical Information
System (GIS). The use of GIS as a spatial research tool in studying school
choice has been well rehearsed (Taylor 2007). As long as each individual pupil
can be geo-referenced and the administrative data contains the school des-
tination and some socioeconomic variable(s) for each pupil, it is possible to
simultaneously examine the choice of schools alongside the outcomes of those
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choices on the social mix of each school’s intake. Furthermore, the GIS allows
different choice “scenarios” to be modeled and the resulting effect on school
intakes and measures of segregation to be observed. Not only does this provide
a much more detailed account of the process of segregation, it also helps to
explore the relationship between the process of school choice and the outcome
of school segregation.
Introduction to the Urban Education Market
Most studies of school choice in the United Kingdom focus on schools that
are located in London. This focus on London schools tends to reflect the
greater political and media attention of schooling in London and greater
concerns about school admissions in the capital. Few studies consider the
process of school choice outside London. Therefore, this article examines one
urban market in a city in Wales. This is a medium-sized city with 20 secondary
(high) schools providing places for approximately 22,000 children ages 11–16
years,1 all located within the control and auspices of one local authority. Of
these, five are faith-based schools and two are Welsh-medium schools.2 These
schools represent the “diversity” in UK schooling discussed earlier as they
manage their own admission arrangements and form distinct self-governing
competition spaces. In parallel competition to these divergent schools are the
remaining 13 (English-medium) Community schools.
For these 13 Community schools, the local authority is responsible for the
admissions process and the residential area of the local authority is divided
into 13 congruent “catchment” areas—one for each school. Once a year the
local authority writes to parents with children who are expected to transfer
to secondary schools in the following year advising parents which school their
“child would normally attend by reference to the child’s place of residence”
([Urban Authority] 2004,17). This allocation is based on predefined catchment
areas. However, parents are then invited to nominate an alternative school
as their preferred school. If the number of applicants exceeds the number of
places available, otherwise known as the Standard Admission Number, a series
of oversubscription criteria are employed to prioritize particular applicants
over others. For the Community schools, priority is given to those applicants
living in the designated catchment area of the preferred school. Priority is
then given in declining order to those applicants who have compelling social
and/or medical needs in attending their preferred school and then to appli-
cants with siblings already attending the preferred school. If there are places
still available after these criteria have been employed, then priority is given
to those applicants based on their proximity to their preferred school, as
measured by the shortest practicable walking route. It is important to note
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that this latter criterion is also employed if there needs to be a distinction
drawn between applicants as determined by the other oversubscription criteria.
These admission arrangements are quite common in England and Wales,
particularly outside London (White et al. 2001).
Parents also have the opportunity to apply directly to one or more of the
other divergent schools. The oversubscription criteria for the divergent schools
are notably different from those for the Community schools, reflecting their
particular educational ethos (e.g., parents have to demonstrate that they reg-
ularly practice a particular religious belief ). As has already been discussed,
admissions to these divergent schools has always been available through school
choice. Recent reforms to expand school choice in England and Wales have
mainly changed admissions to Community schools. The main impact of di-
vergent schools in recent years has largely been the expansion in the number
of such schools and places available in them. However, the number and size
of divergent schools in this Welsh urban market have remained relatively
unchanged for many years. Therefore, the main focus of the following analysis
is largely on the choice between, and impact on, Community schools, thereby
attempting to isolate the impact of recent school reforms on school choice
and open enrollment from the long-established “parallel” provision of faith-
based schools and, in the context of Wales, Welsh-medium schools.
The data for this analysis were obtained from the local authority for all
pupils in secondary schools, ages 11–16 years. Individual pupil data were geo-
referenced using their home postcode (or zip code). Each postcode in the
United Kingdom is given a grid reference point—these are generalized for
the postcode area to ensure some degree of anonymity for individual families
and can therefore be up to 200 meters from the actual home of the pupil.
However, the accuracy of this conversion is greater in urban and more densely
populated areas. These points can then be analyzed in a GIS both spatially
and by the pupils’ socioeconomic background. The primary socioeconomic
variable used in this analysis is whether individual pupils were eligible for free
school meals (FSM) or not—this eligibility is based on levels of household
income. In 2002, 17 percent of all secondary-school-aged pupils in Wales and
18 percent of all secondary-school-aged pupils in this urban education market
were eligible for FSM—representing the most socioeconomically disadvan-
taged families.
It is evident, then, from the admission arrangements for this urban education
market that there are a number of different choice scenarios that can be
modeled and compared by analyzing individual pupil data in a GIS. In each
scenario pupils can be hypothetically allocated to different schools according
to different criteria. This article initially examines the impact of choice on
segregation under four different scenarios: (1) based on the actual choice of
schools (Actual Intake); (2) based on the allocation of pupils by the catchment
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FIG. 1.—Segregation (S ) of pupils eligible for free school meals, 1991–2002
area they live in (Catchment Intake); (3) based on the allocation of pupils to
their nearest school, as measured by the straight-line distance between school
and home (Proximity Intake); (4) based on a random allocation of pupils to
schools (Random Intake).3
Socioeconomic Segregation between Schools
The analysis begins by considering the actual choice of schools and the re-
sulting Actual Intake. Traditional analyses of school segregation have largely
been interested in changes in segregation over time. In this article the Seg-
regation Index (S )—which measures the proportion of a subset minority group
that would have to move school for all schools to have their “fair share” of
that subset group—is utilized. The fair share is equal to the proportion of the
subset group across the whole area concerned. This measure is proven to be
compositionally invariant, and therefore unnecessarily unaffected by changes
in the overall proportion of the subset group over time. (See Gorard and
Taylor [2002] and Gorard et al. [2003] for more details about this measure.)
However, there are other measures of segregation that can also be employed,
such as the Dissimilarity Index and the Isolation Index, but each generally
has its limitations. Figure 1 illustrates the level of segregation of students eligible
for FSM between schools over time.4 It shows the level of socioeconomic
segregation (i) between all schools in Wales, (ii) between all schools in this
urban education market, and (iii) between the Community schools in this
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FIG. 2.—Social geography of the urban education market: adults in low-paid occupations by
ward (includes those in semiroutine and routine occupations and long-term unemployed).
market only. This shows that levels of socioeconomic segregation between all
schools in Wales (i.e., at the national level) have slightly decreased over this
12-year period. However, levels of between-school segregation in this urban
market remain relatively unchanged since 1991. Figure 1 also shows that with
the inclusion of the divergent schools, levels of segregation are generally higher
than they are for levels of segregation just between the Community schools
The problem with these comparisons of segregation between schools over
time, along with many other attempts to analyze segregation, is that they do
not account for the underlying residential segregation of the urban education
market. Indeed, the actual composition of the 13 Community school intakes
(as measured by the proportion of students eligible for FSM) corresponds
closely to the social geography of the urban area (as measured by the pro-
portion of adults in low-paid occupations; see fig. 2). Although there are quite
marked differences in the socioeconomic composition of school intakes in this
urban market, as seen by comparing the intakes of schools in the southwest
and schools in the north of the urban area, this could largely be related to
the residential geography and lack of choice within the urban market.
However, a more rigorous way of examining this relationship is to compare
these actual levels of segregation with the impact on school segregation under
the other three choice scenarios. The comparative results for the following
year are presented in table 1. This shows that the level of socioeconomic
segregation between schools as a result of school choice (Actual Intake) is only
slightly higher than if pupils chose only (or if they were allocated to) their
designated catchment school (Catchment Intake). However, this in turn would
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TABLE 1
Comparative Measures of Segregation (S) be-
tween Community Schools (Using Individual
Student Data)
Intake S
Actual Intake .27
Catchment Intake .26
Proximity Intake .25
Random Intake .02
lead to slightly greater segregation than if pupils went to their nearest school
(Proximity Intake). This suggests that the catchments areas, determined by
the local authority, slightly exaggerate the level of segregation between schools
in comparison to the level if catchment areas were determined only by distance.
It also reflects the housing market’s response to the use of catchment areas
as an oversubscription criterion. Nevertheless, given the underlying levels of
residential segregation, it appears that school choice has slightly exacerbated
the levels of segregation between Community schools in this urban market.
If students were allocated a school randomly (Random Intake) then it is clear
that socioeconomic segregation would be very low, but notably not zero.5
The opportunity to model different choice scenarios and examine the impact
these have on levels of between-school segregation has already provided a
more nuanced understanding of school choice and its impacts, and an analysis
like this is able to demonstrate the importance of residential segregation on
school segregation. However, this still does not say much about the process
of segregation and its relationship to school choice. For example, why are
levels of segregation higher with school choice (Actual Intake above) than if
schools were simply chosen on their proximity to the family home (Proximity
Intake above)? Also, in the context of wider debates about the impact of school
choice, it may be equally relevant to also ask why segregation between schools
in this urban education market is not even higher. Examining levels of seg-
regation using aggregated numbers of pupils by schools and local authorities
can provide only a partial representation of the impact of school choice, even
when using these different choice scenarios.
It is generally the case that most analyses of segregation between schools
use the local authority as their unit of analysis—that is, that segregation is
measured between all schools across a large institutional area. This example
conducts analyses across an entire urban area with 13 Community schools
(plus a further seven divergent schools). It is important that any measurement
of segregation also occurs at an appropriate local level. One way of doing this
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is to identify the competition spaces or local networks of schools where the
majority of school choice occurs (Taylor 2001b).
Competition and Choice between Schools
The real value of a geographical approach to studying school choice using
data on individual pupils and a GIS is that it is possible to explore the dis-
tribution of individual pupils to schools under these different choice scenarios,
that is, identifying which pupils would attend which schools based on these
different choice criteria. So, for example, by comparing the Actual Intakes
with the Catchment Intakes it is possible to see the impact of school com-
petition on pupil numbers. Overall, three-quarters of pupils attended their
catchment area school. In other words, it appears that one in four pupils
successfully employed school choice to obtain a place in an alternative school
to the one they were originally allocated by the local authority.6 Compared
with other urban education markets this may appear relatively low (see Taylor
[2002] for other comparisons); however, this does not include pupils attending
the two Welsh-medium and five faith-based schools (the divergent schools).
Further analysis reveals that only 65 percent of students attend their nearest
school (as a straight line measurement). This would suggest that the use of
catchment areas, both in terms of the initial allocation of students to schools
and in the oversubscription criteria, plays an important role in defining the
distribution of students to schools and therefore the composition of school
intakes. This could be because they are important in guiding the original
choice of schools or in their importance in allocating oversubscribed school
places.
The impact on pupil numbers can also be considered for each school (table
2). This begins to provide a much better representation of school choice and
the impact on school intakes. Table 2 shows which schools would have ad-
mitted more pupils (net) if they had been allocated by the catchment area
they lived in.7 Conversely, it also highlights the schools that admitted fewer
students (net) as a result of school choice. It is clear from this table that School
F gained the most net pupils (364) from outside its catchment area. Contrast
this with School A, with the greatest net loss of pupils (420) to other schools.
However, it is important to recall that school intakes in the United Kingdom
are capped, so the number or percentage of “gains” does not necessarily reflect
the popularity of each school. For example, School L and School D had more
applications than there were places in the last year of entry, yet neither of
them are the top two schools with the most proportionate gains (table 2).
Figure 3 illustrates the spatial distribution of these gains and losses between
all schools. This does not show all patterns of choice between schools; it simply
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TABLE 2
Summary of Gains and Losses for Community Schools
School
Actual
Intake
Catchment
Intake
Net Gains
(or Losses)
Actual Intake
(as % of
Catchment
Intake)
Admissions for Last
Year of Entry (as % of
Standard Admission
Number)
F 1,041 677 364 154 100
H 784 536 248 146 47
L 1,181 908 273 130 100
B 744 606 138 123 76
M 1,169 954 215 123 80
G 1,888 1,825 63 104 100
D 1,075 1,046 29 103 133
K 1,381 1,345 36 103 100
C 832 968 (136) 86 85
E 1,316 1,571 (255) 84 87
I 868 1,144 (276) 76 57
J 706 988 (282) 72 48
A 479 899 (420) 53 35
illustrates the most significant patterns of choice (i.e., where there are 10 or
more net gains between schools). From this it is clear that choice and com-
petition between all Community schools in this urban market are interlinked;
that is, while one school may gain pupils from another school, it too could
be losing pupils to a third school. This is typical of many urban education
markets in the United Kingdom (Taylor 2002). However, as discussed earlier,
more detailed studies reveal that school choice often takes place at a local
level, and this approach provides a way of distinguishing between different
competition spaces within a given education market. Although they are all
interlinked, it is possible to identify from figure 3 five different competition
spaces in this urban market (table 3).
The first competition space presented (example 1) illustrates a hierarchical
competition space of approximately four tiers. At the top of the hierarchy is
School F, which gains relatively large numbers of pupils from Schools A, B,
and E. As a result, School F makes significant gains overall. School E is in
the second tier, School B the third, and, finally, School A in the fourth and
lowest tier. Although School E gains some pupils from the catchment areas
of Schools B and A, they do not counter the significant losses to School F.
Conversely, any losses from School B to Schools F and E are easily offset by
the significantly large number of pupils it gains from School A’s catchment
area. As a result, School E and School A both experience significant net losses
overall from competition with the other two schools, although for different
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FIG. 3.—Net gains between secondary schools in urban education market
reasons, and despite School E being in the second tier of this competition
space. It should also be noted that this is not a discrete competition space.
All of these schools appear to be in some competition with other schools in
the urban education market. Most notable are the impacts of School D, School
H, and School G that gain pupils from at least one of these four schools in
this first example (fig. 3). This would suggest that further tiers could be added
at the top of this hierarchical competition space, reflecting the number of
pupils, although less significant, that choose alternative schools.
The second example in table 3 highlights another significant hierarchical
competition space. This is in a different area of the urban market involving
just three schools in two tiers. At the top of this hierarchy is School L, which
makes significant gains from School I and School K. An important distinction
between this example and the previous competition space discussed is that
these latter schools (I and K) are not in any obvious or significant competition
with one another. As a consequence of these patterns of school choice, School
L makes significant gains overall. Again, this competition space is not discrete.
For example, it is clear that School L attracts pupils from a large number of
other schools’ catchment areas.
The third and fourth examples of competition spaces in this urban education
market involve just two schools, respectively, reflecting their greater relative
isolation. Although there are gains and losses between both pairs of schools,
the resulting net movement of students highlights the greater attraction of
students to School M (example 3) and School H (example 4). As before, the
movement of pupils in figure 3 to and from these schools shows that they are
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TABLE 3
Five Competition Spaces in the Urban Education Market
COMPETITION SPACE
% OF PUPILS
OBTAINING
GCSE
GRADES A*–C
PERCENTAGE OF INTAKE ELIGIBLE FOR
FSM
Actual
Intake
Catchment
Intake
Proximity
Intake
1. Hierarchical (4 tiers):
School F 28 31.0 29.0 29.7
School E 26 44.5 43.1 40.1
School B 20 48.1 41.3 45.3
School A 21 55.1 52.5 49.9
2. Hierarchical (2 tiers):
School L 75 5.2 3.7 7.6
School K 55 11.7 11.9 9.6
School I 27 31.7 26.8 26.2
3. Hierarchical (2 tiers):
School M 26 37.8 38.8 43.4
School J 29 43.3 41.0 28.5
4. Hierarchical (2 tiers):
School H 29 34.9 26.1 19.4
School C 24 46.4 45.1 47.0
5. Nonhierarchical:
School G 54 12.3 12.4 13.9
School D 66 6.9 6.5 6.0
NOTE.—GCSE p General Certificate of Secondary Education; FSM p free school meals.
not entirely isolated from competition with other Community schools in the
area.
The final form of competition space represented in table 3 (example 5)
identifies two schools that are in competition with one another and other
schools. However, the complexities of the urban market do not allow for them
to be classified in any particular hierarchical competition space. Consequently,
these schools occupy a particular form of competition within the urban market
that probably results in very different impacts on other schools. They are all
in competition with other schools, but not to the degree that would suggest
they are in direct competition with particular schools over significant numbers
of pupils. This can be easily seen by examining the net movement of pupils
to and from these schools in figure 3.
The importance of identifying each of these competition spaces, particularly
the hierarchical competition spaces, is the relationship they have with the
examination performance and the socioeconomic composition of each school’s
intake. In nearly every example presented in table 3, the school’s position
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within a hierarchy reflects the percentage of pupils (in a typical year) that
obtained grades A*–C in five or more General Certificate of Secondary Ed-
ucation exams; the higher the position of a school in their hierarchical com-
petition space, the greater the overall examination performance of Year 11
pupils. The exception to this is the nonhierarchical competition space (example
5) and example 3 (Schools M and J). However, the relationship between a
school’s position in the hierarchical competition spaces and the proportion of
pupils attending that school who are eligible for FSM is even more evident
(and exists for all four hierarchical competition spaces identified). So, the higher
the position of a school in their hierarchical competition space, the lower the
proportion of pupils in their intakes eligible for FSM (i.e., there are fewer
socioeconomic disadvantaged pupils going to these schools).
This more detailed examination of school choice and competition in the
urban education market would give the impression that there is a close re-
lationship between choice and the schools’ intake characteristics (as presented
here in terms of the overall examination performance of a school’s intake and
the proportion of pupils eligible for FSM) within each competition space. And
it would go some way to help explain why detailed qualitative studies of school
choice would suggest that the education market is likely to polarize school
intakes—this would certainly appear to be the case if just the choice of schools
(or not) being made were studied. However, table 3 also demonstrates that
the main alternative methods of allocating school places (by catchment area
or proximity) would produce a similar relationship between the socioeconomic
composition of these schools and their position in the respective competition
spaces, thus still reflecting localized residential differentiation.8
An important distinction between this detailed analysis by competition space
and the earlier analysis of between-school segregation for all schools is that it
is now possible to see how the composition of school intakes may be changed
due to school choice. For example, differences in the composition of the Actual
Intakes and Catchment Intakes are not associated with the position of the
school in each hierarchy. In the first example from table 3, School F at the
top of the hierarchical competition space is taking more pupils eligible for
FSM than if the intake were allocated by catchment area. Therefore, it would
appear that it is taking closer to its “fair share” of socioeconomically disad-
vantaged pupils—suggesting a process of desegregation. However, School A
at the bottom of the same hierarchical competition space is taking an increased
share of pupils eligible for FSM, and more than its fair share—which suggests
a process of segregation. Of course, in this example there must be a “flight”
(Waslander and Thrupp 1995) of non-FSM pupils out of this competition
space and into adjoining or distant competition spaces (see fig. 3). Nevertheless,
this complex mixing of pupils in schools occurs in examples 2 and 4 presented
in table 3. The only competition spaces where there are clear patterns of
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segregation or desegregation are in example 3 (an apparently segregating com-
petition space) and example 5 (an apparently desegregating competition space).
For a situation to occur where it is possible to identify processes of segre-
gation and desegregation within a single urban education market, and even
within the same competition space, there clearly must be a complex relation-
ship between school choice and between-school segregation.
Conclusions
Numerous other spatial analyses of school choice have already provided rea-
sons why socioeconomic and ethnic segregation have not significantly in-
creased. However, from this detailed examination of one urban education
market in Wales there would appear to be two clear and additional expla-
nations as to why school choice does not appear to have exacerbated socio-
economic segregation between schools. First, just as there are examples of
competition spaces within an urban education market with increased segre-
gation as a result of school choice, there are examples where the opposite
trend, of reduced segregation, also exists. And second, within each competition
space it is quite probable that some schools, particularly those that already
exist at the top of any hierarchical competition space, admit closer to their
fair share of students eligible for FSM as a result of school choice.
But this is not the end of the story. Given these conclusions, it is still easy
to see how processes of school choice may appear to promote socioeconomic
segregation. The inclusion of divergent schools in the analysis would have
shown greater socioeconomic segregation between schools. But, most impor-
tant, the existence of hierarchies of choice and competition suggests there are
clear “winners” and “losers” in the education market. Supporters of school
choice will be relieved to see that the socioeconomic compositions of many
school winners are increasingly becoming mixed. However, there is a worrying
trend among some of the losers; as a result of many families choosing alter-
native schools (including those with FSM and non-FSM children), the pupils
that remain are more likely to be eligible for FSM and from low socioeconomic
backgrounds and are therefore becoming more ghettoized.
This article has detailed the most significant findings that constitute a ge-
ography of school choice. The advantages of this approach to studying school
choice have also been highlighted. While the findings presented here clearly
do not cover all the issues relating to school choice, it should now be clear
how and why a geography of school choice provides a useful framework in
which to continue to explore these issues. However, one of the main limitations
to a solely geographical approach is that school choice is changing all the
time. Not only has the national program of legislation for open enrollment
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in England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland been modified and ad-
justed over time but there are a number of other important ways in which
school choice may be changing over time. This includes the way schools have
responded to open enrollment, changes in the supply of places and school
provision (a good example of this is the dramatic increase in specialist schools
and the rise in segregation), and changes in the demand for school places
over time. These temporal problems are compounded by the fact that the
supply of school places is relatively inelastic, which means that as more parents
try to get a place in a school of their choice, as opposed to their local or
allocated school, a growing proportion of families will inevitably be unsuc-
cessful. In the short term we see annual fluctuations in the number of appli-
cations to popular schools due to the publication of success rates in obtaining
school places the year before. How this affects school choice in the medium
to longer term is less clear. Further inquiry into the spatial relationships and
characteristics of school choice and the education market over time is still
required before fully appreciating the impact of school choice reforms.
Notes
1. The majority of secondary schools in this urban market also offer provision for
16–18-year-olds. However, since this provision is not homogenous across all schools,
this analysis examines only the choice and composition of 11–16-year-olds (i.e., those
years that are compulsory).
2. Wales is a bilingual country of the United Kingdom. Although the language of
Welsh is now compulsory in all schools in Wales, schools are typically divided into
English-medium or Welsh-medium, where the principle language of instruction for all
subjects is either English or Welsh, respectively.
3. A random allocation of students to schools is included for substantive and meth-
odological reasons. Substantively there is growing debate in the United Kingdom about
using random allocation as a way of allocating oversubscribed places. This is seen as
the only way that segregation can be removed from the state-funded school system.
To date there are only a few examples in which random allocation is used, albeit in
a very limited way (e.g., Brighton and Hove, England). The methodological reason is
discussed later.
4. , where Ai is the number of children eligible for FSMSp 0.5# (SFAi/ACi/CF)
in school i, Ci is the total number of children in school i, A is the total number of
children eligible for FSM in the chosen area, and C is the total number of children
in the chosen area.
5. There has been some debate about whether descriptive measures of segregation
such as the Segregation Index (S ) and the Dissimilarity Index can have a score of
zero—absolutely no segregation. The result presented here confirms that there is a
small bias in such measures despite students being distributed randomly. How significant
these biases in the measures are is debatable. However, most important to this analysis
is that the level of segregation by random allocation as an indicator of bias is larger
than the difference between the measures of segregation by choice versus segregation
This content downloaded from 131.251.254.13 on Fri, 21 Feb 2014 09:27:53 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Taylor
AUGUST 2009 567
by catchment area—which suggests we cannot be confident that segregation by choice
is significantly different to segregation by catchment area or by proximity.
6. Of course this does not include those parents and pupils who exercised school
choice but who were not able to get a place in their preferred choice of school.
7. Net figures are presented in table 2 for simplicity. In all schools there are gains
and losses (as defined by the different choice scenarios), but we are largely interested
in the net impact of these choices on school intakes.
8. A comparison of the examination performance of a school is not possible for the
hypothetical catchment intake.
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